

TRUSTORE : Side-Channel Resistant Storage for SGX using Intel Hybrid CPU-FPGA

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


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Motivation

- **Intel SGX** (Software Guard eXtension)
 - Processor extension providing shielded execution environment, called an *enclave*
 - Protected even from the privileged SWs (OS, hypervisor)



[Slide from Prerit Jain et al., NDSS 2016]

- However, SGX is vulnerable to various **memory-based side-channels**
 - Page-fault-based [S&P15], cache-based [WOOT17], branch-prediction [Security17], ForeShadow [Security18], RIDL [S&P19], Fallout [CCS19], ...

Motivation


- Conventional defense: ORAM (Oblivious RAM)

- Cryptographically proven protection
- Dummy objects are appended
- Shuffled after each access.

- Protection systems using ORAM for Intel SGX


- ZeroTrace [Sasy et al., NDSS 2018]
 - data structures
- Obliviate [Ahmad et al., NDSS 2018]
 - file systems
- Obfuscuro [Ahmad et al., NDSS 2019]
 - blackbox-based program execution

- Notorious for *high performance overhead (100x~ slower in general)*



Motivation

- Our approach: using **FPGA** as an external storage device
 - **Flexible and efficient** programmable hardware
 - **Highly available**
 - Pluggable PCIe cards (Intel PAC, Xilinx Alveo)




; Amazon, Micro




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How Data Box Edge facilitates data transfer to Azure




Data Box Edge combines IoT Edge, a cloud storage gateway, and an FPGA for accelerated ML in an edge compute appliance



Design Overview of *TrustOre*

- Design overview




- Two major components

- **TrustLib:** In-enclave library establishing and managing the communication channel
 - Various APIs: alloc/dealloc/access, open/close/read/write/fsync
- **TrustMod:** HW module loaded to the FPGA


TrustOre Designs

- Secure Loading of FPGA module



FPGA Chip
Manufacturer

TRUSTORE
Developer



- Baking the keys inside FPGA during manufacturing

- k_{AES}^{bitstr} for bitstream encryption
- k_{Priv}^{bitstr} , k_{Pub}^{bitstr} for bitstream authentication

- Provisioning FPGA and signing *TrustMod* bitstream by trusted manufacturer
- Introducing k_{Priv}^{attest} , k_{Pub}^{attest} to remotely attest *TrustMod*

TrustOre Designs


- **Secure Channel Establishment**

- **Remote attestation**

- Sending random nonce
- Verifying the returned nonce signed by k_{Priv}^{attest}


- **Secret key sharing**

- Enhancing the security by augmenting authentication on Diffie-Hellman key exchange
- AES key is shared as session key



TrustOre Designs

- *TrustLib* ↔ *TrustMod* communication on secure channel
 - All requests/responses are transmitted in the form of encrypted transaction packet





- *TrustOre* guarantees
 - *Constant* packet length: dummy padding
 - *Constant* response time: *TrustMod* always takes worst-case cycle
 - *Constant* address access pattern: repeatedly access on fixed MMIO/DMA
 - note) real address of object is concealed within the packet

Evaluation

- Environment
 - *TrustMod* on Xilinx Zynq-7000 ZC706
 - *TrustLib* on SGX-enabled Intel i7-6700 CPU
 - ZC706 card is plugged on the system via PCIe interface
- Compare *TrustOre*-based scheme with ORAM-based scheme:
 - ZeroTrace (for data arrays)
 - Obliviate (for files)
 - Obfuscuero (oblivious program execution system based on ORAM)

Evaluation

- Data array access (vs ZeroTrace)
 - **49x faster** access for various data block sizes (8B~8KB)
 - Constant throughput when # of data blocks increases
- File access (vs Obliviate)
 - **10x faster** access for 1GB file
 - TrustOre also shows constant throughput for file size
- Program obfuscation (vs Obfuscuro)
 - **10.85x faster** at micro benchmarks (findmax, sum, matmul)
 - More faster when input data size is increased
- Nbench, key-value store application
 - **120x faster** at oblivious nbench execution
 - **188x faster** at oblivious key-value data access



Conclusion

- We proposed *TrustOre*
 - Side-channel resistant storage for SGX using Intel hybrid CPU-FPGA
 - Implemented on commodity FPGA PCIe card
- *TrustOre* avoids memory-based side-channel attacks
 - Security mechanisms making FPGA be securely isolated from rest of the system
 - Secure loading, secure channel establishment, remote attestation, side-channel mitigations
- *TrustOre* shows higher performance than ORAM-based schemes, scales well as the data size increases
 - 120 – 188 times faster for real-world workloads